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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has sole discretion in the granting or denying of a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Utah Court of Appeals adjudication. UTAH CODE
ANN. §78-2-2(5). The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the Utah
Court of Appeals. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue I. Whether an occupant who holds title to real property subject to a reversionary
interest - as reflected by the 1993 Deed in this case - is entitled to compensation for
improvements under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act and, if so, whether the court of
appeals properly determined the value of those improvements. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court reviews the court of appeals decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no
deference. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, U 7, 86 P.3d 742.
Issue II. Whether the 1993 Deed required Petitioner Allen to assume any existing
mortgage notwithstanding intervening refinancing of that mortgage by Petitioner Allen's
wife and a third-party. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the court of appeals
decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. State v. Geukgeuzian,
2004 UT 16,1(7, 86P.3d742.
Issue III. Whether the court of appeals failed to consider Petitioner Allen's own claim
for unjust enrichment. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the court of appeals
decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. State v. Geukgeuzian,
2004 UT 1 6 4 7, 86P.3d742.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provision is determinative or of central importance to this
appeal:
UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1 et.seq.

Utah Occupying Claimants Act.

See

Addendum, Exhibit "A."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner Allen conveyed certain real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah (the
"Property") to his former spouse, Ms. Satterfield, pursuant to a Decree of Divorce. Petitioner
Allen conveyed to Ms. Satterfield a fee simple determinable, subject to a possibility of
reverter, and retained a right of reversion in the Property. Upon the occurrence of the
determining events, the fee simple determinable automatically terminated and title to the
Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen by operation of law. Petitioner Allen
gave notice of his claim of title, ownership and possession of the Property to Ms.
Satterfield's successor in interest, Respondent Hall. Respondent Hall refused to relinquish
possession of the Property and this case ensued.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Petitioner Allen brought suit against Respondent Hall and Respondent Homecomings
on May 18, 2000 claiming: (1) right to title, ownership and possession of the Property; and
(2) restitution of the unjust enrichment of Respondents for their failure to relinquish the
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Property to Petitioner Allen upon the automatic reversion of the Property to him by operation
of law. Record at 4, Complaint.
Respondent Hall answered the allegations of the complaint denying the same and
brought his counterclaim alleging: (1) ownership of the Property free and clear of the
possibility of reverter of Petitioner Allen; (2) damages for the unjust enrichment of Petitioner
Allen from improvements made to the Property by Respondent Hall; (3) damages pursuant
to UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1, et.seq., the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, for
improvements made to the Property by Respondent Hall; and (4) damages for Respondent
Hall's inability to refinance the Property during the pendency of the matter. Record at 106,
Answer and Counterclaim.
Respondent Hall brought a third-party claim against Colonial Title Insurance Agency,
Michael E. Huber and Ms. Satterfield seeking indemnification for any loss sustained by him
if Petitioner Allen were to prevail. Record at 128, Third Party Complaint. The third-party
complaint against Colonial Title Insurance Agency and Michael E. Huber was dismissed on
summary judgment. Record at 461, Order of Dismissal Third Party Defendants.
Respondent Homecomings answered the allegations of the Complaint denying the
same.
The matter was tried before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on May 20,2003. The
trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 10,2003. Record at
530, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court entered its Order and Decree
Quieting Title on July 2, 2003. Record at 544, Order and Decree Quieting Title. The trial
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court denied Petitioner Allen's claim to the Property and also denied his claim for unjust
enrichment without comment, presumably because with no ownership interest in the
Property, Petitioner Allen could not maintain a claim for unjust enrichment from the
Property. Record at 545. The trial court quieted title to the Property in Respondent Hall,
found Respondent Hall's claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act to be moot
inasmuch as title to the Property was awarded to Respondent Hall and denied Respondent
Hall's claim for damages for inability to refinance the Property. Record at 545. The trial
court did not rule on Respondent Hall's third-party claim against Ms. Satterfield, presumably
because it also would be moot inasmuch as title to the Property was awarded to Respondent
Hall.
Petitioner Allen filed his Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Order and Decree
Quieting Title with the Utah Supreme Court on July 31,2003 and the matter was transferred
to the Utah Court of Appeals. Record at 547. On January 21, 2005, the Utah Court of
Appeals issued its Opinion reversing in part and affirming in part. See Addendum, Exhibit
"B." The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Petitioner Allen's claim
to the Property and awarded title to the Property to Petitioner Allen. The Utah Court of
Appeals did not address Petitioner Allen's claim for restitution of Respondents' unjust
enrichment from the Property. The Utah Court of Appeals found that because Respondent
Hall was not entitled to the Property, his claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act was
not moot and the court awarded him damages under that Act. The Utah Court of Appeals
also found that Petitioner Allen was obligated to pay all debts on the Property.
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Statement of Facts
On or about May 15, 1989, Petitioner Allen acquired the Property. The Property is
located at 10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. Record at 580. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
On or about May 17, 1990, Petitioner Allen and his former spouse, Ms. Satterfield,
were legally divorced by order of a Decree of Divorce. Record at 585. See Addendum,
Exhibit "C."
Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce, Ms. Satterfield was awarded the
Property subject to Petitioner Allen's possibility of reverter which was triggered if Ms.
Satterfield moved more than fifty (50) miles away from Salt Lake City, Utah, before
Petitioner Allen's youngest child reached the age of eighteen (18) years. Record at 586-587.
See Addendum, Exhibit "C."
On or about October 28, 1993, Petitioner Allen executed a Quitclaim Deed Subject
to Reservations, Reversions, and Exceptions transferring to Msr. Satterfield an interest in the
Property, subject to Petitioner Allen's possibility of reverter, (the " 1993 Deed"). Record at
590. See Addendum, Exhibit "D."
The 1993 Deed states that it is subject to the rights and reservations included in the
Decree of Divorce and specifically recites "...if the grantee [Ms. Satterfield] shall move more
than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, before the grantor [Petitioner Allen] and grantee's
[Ms. Satterfield's] last child reaches 18 years of age, title and ownership of the abovedescribed property [the Property] shall revert to grantor [Petitioner Allen]." Record at 591.
See Addendum, Exhibit "D."
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Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the 1993 Deed, Ms. Satterfield's interest in the
Property is subject to Petitioner Allen's possibility of reverter in the Property.

See

Addendum, Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "D."
The Decree of Divorce further provides that if ownership of the Property reverts to
Petitioner Allen, he will sell the Property and divide the proceeds equally with Ms.
Satterfield. The 1993 Deed makes no mention of this provision. See Addendum, Exhibit
"C" and Exhibit "D."
On or about January 19,1998, Ms. Satterfield executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying
her interest in the Property to Respondent Hall (the "Hall Quit Claim Deed"). The Hall Quit
Claim Deed was duly filed with and recorded by the Salt Lake County Recorder on June 23,
1999. See Defendants' Exhibit 12.
On or about June 7,1999, Respondent Hall and his wife, Elizabeth J. Hall, executed
a Deed of Trust conveying a security interest in the Property to Respondent Homecomings
to secure the repayment of a loan to Respondent Hall by Respondent Homecomings. The
Deed of Trust was duly filed with and recorded by the Salt Lake County Recorder on June
23, 1999. Record at 658.
On or about July 19,1999, Ms. Satterfield moved more than 50 miles from Salt Lake
City, Utah, triggering the determining event in Respondent Hall's fee simple determinable
and title to the Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen. Record at 595.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Respondent Hall is not entitled to any recovery under the Utah Occupying

Claimants Act because he lacked "color of title" as required by that Act. There is a
distinction between color of title and actual or legal title, with color of title being less than,
but not included in, an actual or legal title. Respondent Hall held actual and legal title to the
Property in the form of a fee simple determinable, subject to possibility of reverter, but
Respondent Hall did not have color of title as required by the Utah Occupying Claimants Act.
The Utah Occupying Claimants Act is not intended to compensate legal owners of real
property whose title terminates in the normal course by operation of law.
If Respondent Hall were entitled to recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants
Act, the amount of that recovery was improperly determined by the court of appeals. The
matter should be remanded to the trial court for determination of the amount of the recovery
in accordance with the terms of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act.
2.

Neither the 1993 Deed nor the Decree of Divorce required Petitioner Allen to

assume or to satisfy any indebtedness of the Property which was not in existence on the date
of the Decree of Divorce. The 1993 Deed makes no mention of any obligation or payment.
The Decree of Divorce clearly speaks to the debt encumbering the Property at the time of the
Decree of Divorce and the related equity but makes no provision for the payment by
Petitioner Allen of any subsequent indebtedness. If the language of the Decree of Divorce
is not sufficiently clear, then parol evidence of the parties' intent must be considered. That
evidence is uncontroverted and clearly states that Petitioner Allen was not to assume any
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obligation for subsequent indebtedness on the Property. Neither Respondent Hall nor
Respondent Homecomings has any basis for claim under the Decree of Divorce because
neither is a party to the Decree of Divorce and neither can claim to be a third-party
beneficiary under the Decree of Divorce.
3.

Petitioner Allen's claim for restitution of the unjust enrichment to Respondents

became moot when the trial court denied Petitioner Allen's claim of title. However, when
the court of appeals reversed the trial court and awarded Petitioner Allen title to the Property,
it would be inequitable for Respondents to retain the benefits of possession and use of the
Property, after their interests terminated, without compensating Petitioner Allen for the value
of those benefits. Ownership of the Properly automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen on
July 19,1999. When his title terminated, Respondent Hall refused to deliver possession and
use of the Property to Petitioner Allen and retained the benefits of ownership, possession and
use of the Property for himself. From July 19, 1999 until the date that Petitioner Allen
ultimately obtains his rights of ownership, possession and use of the Property, Respondent
Hall is unjustly enriched in that he has accepted the benefits of possession and use of
Petitioner Allen's Property, he had knowledge that he was retaining those benefits and that
doing so was adverse to Petitioner Allen's ownership, and he retained those benefits for
himself under circumstances which would make it inequitable for him to do so without
payment of their value to Petitioner Allen.
ARGUMENTS
I. WHETHER AN OCCUPANT WHO HOLDS TITLE TO PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A
REVERSIONARY INTEREST - AS REFLECTED BY THE 1993 DEED IN THIS CASE
8

- IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS UNDER THE UTAH
OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS ACT AND, IF SO, WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
PROPERLY DETERMINED THE VALUE OF THOSE IMPROVEMENTS.
Respondent Hall acquired a fee simple determinable, subject to possibility of reverter,
title to the Property. Upon the occurrence of the determining event, Respondent Hall's
interest in the Property automatically terminated by operation of law. Respondent Hall made
a claim to recover compensation for the value of improvements that he made to the Property
while he was the legal owner. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act does not and is not
intended to provide a remedy to legal owners of real property whose ownership terminates
in the normal course by operation of law.
A.

Recovery Under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act.

The Utah Occupying Claimants Act, as presently codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§57-6-1 et seq., has been in existence for almost one hundred years. Yet during that time,
only approximately two dozen reported cases, including this case, have been brought
asserting a claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. In each of these cases, claims
under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act were asserted only by claiming occupying real
property but without actual title to the same, such as an adverse possession interest in real
property or by claimants who had obtained their "color of title" through a defective or
disputed tax sale or through fraud or misrepresentation. In none of these cases, excepting
this case, did any claimant assert or was any claimant awarded any recovery under the Utah
Occupying Claimants Act for improvements made while the claimant held valid legal title
to real property.
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The important element to note here is that the Utah Occupying Claimants Act is to
provide a remedy to occupants of real property, who reasonably believe that they own real
property, but in reality lack legal title, and who under their mistaken belief of ownership
make improvements to real property. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act is not intended to
provide a remedy to owners of real property whose estate terminates by operation of law.
Hence, the Act is named for its intended beneficiaries, "occupying claimants" not the
"owning claimants."
Phrased another way, the Utah Occupying Claimants Act is intended to benefit those
whose good faith belief of ownership is subsequently proved false, and not those whose
actual legal ownership terminates by operation of law.
The rulings of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case are inconsistent with
the established law of real property and are in conflict with the established application of the
Utah Occupying Claimants Act in all other reported Utah cases.
For example, if the rulings of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case are
to be followed, the holder of a life estate in real property, or more specifically his heirs, could
make a claim upon the termination of the life estate against the holder of the remainder
interest in real property to recover the value of improvements made to real property by the
life tenant during the term of his life estate. This is obviously not the intent of the Utah
Occupying Claimants Act. It is well established in real property law that upon the
termination of a life estate, any improvements made to real property by the life tenant pass
with the real property to the remainderman or to the holder of the reversionary interest.
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More to the point, if the ruling of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case
are to be followed, the holder of any estate which is less than a fee simple absolute could
make a claim to recover the value of improvements to real property upon termination of that
estate, putting an unintended burden upon the remainderman or reversionary interest holder.
Again, this is obviously not the intent of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act.
Moreover, if the ruling of the trial court and the court of appeals in this case are to be
followed, the way would be opened for absurd outcomes. For example, a real property owner
makes valuable improvements to his property in good faith, but neglects to pay the mortgage
and his interest is foreclosed. Would the trial court or the court of appeals allow this property
owner to recover the value of his improvements from the lender? Again, this is obviously
not the intent of the Act.
This Court should limit the scope of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act to include
only those occupants with color of title and not owners who hold actual or legal title.
In this case, Respondent Hall's title to the Property was a fee simple determinable
estate, subject to a possibility of reverter. Upon the occurrence of the determining event,
Respondent Hall's title to the Property terminated. Upon the automatic termination of his
estate, Respondent Hall forfeited all claims to the Property and any improvements thereon.
Respondent Hall realized the full use and enjoyment of the full legal estate to which he was
entitled during the term of his estate and upon termination of his estate he has no claim
against the holder of the reversionary interest either under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act
or otherwise. Respondent Hall's estate in the Property terminated automatically, upon the
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occurrence of the triggering event, he was not "in a proper action found not to be the
owner,...'5 of the Property. UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1.
There are three components to a claim under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. The
claimant must be an occupant of real estate under "color of title," and have made valuable
improvements to the real estate in good faith. Each of these components is addressed here
in turn.
Color of Title. Respondent Hall did not occupy the Property under color of title and
he did not have color of title to the Property. Respondent Hall occupied the Property
pursuant to his actual legal title to the Property, defined as a fee simple determinable, subject
to a possibility of reverter.
It is essential to note that color of title is not legal title. "Color of title" is defined by
Black's Law Dictionary as "that which is a semblance or appearance of title, but is not title
in fact or in law." See McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wash. 2d 24, 253 P.2d 415, 418. This
distinction is consistent with the recognition that the Utah Occupying Claimants Act deals
with disputed or conflicting claims to real property and not to the normal legal succession of
interests in real property.
Petitioner Allen does not dispute that Respondent Hall held legal title to the Property,
but merely points out that as the holder of legal title to the Property, Respondent Hall cannot
claim that he occupies the Property under color of title as the two are inapposite to one
another.

Further, Respondent Hall's legal title to the Property terminated upon the
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occurrence of the triggering event and Petitioner Allen is the legal successor in interest to
the Property by operation of law.
Valuable Improvements. A claimant under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act must
make valuable improvements on the real estate. UTAH CODE ANN. §57-6-1. The Utah
Occupying Claimants Act further requires that the complaint of the party claiming under that
Act "must [emphasis added] set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks relief, stating
as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements
thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such improvements." UTAH
CODE ANN. §57-6-2. Respondent Hall's Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim
did neither and therefore his pleading was defective and his claim should be denied. [Record
at 275]
"The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, and the value of the real
estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial." UTAH CODE
ANN. §57-6-2. Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals determined separately the
value of the real estate or the value of the improvements.
Thus, based upon Respondent Hall's failure to meet the foregoing requirements of the
Utah Occupying Claimants Act, there can be no finding of valuable improvements made to
the Property.

Alternatively, the Court may wish to consider a finding of valuable

improvements in light of the determination of the value of any such improvements as
addressed below.
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Good Faith. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act requires that the claimant must have
made the improvements to the real estate in good faith. The good faith of an occupying
claimant must be premised upon a reasonable and honest belief of ownership. See Ute-Cal
LandDev. Corp. v. Sather, 645 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1982).
The trial court concluded that Respondent Hall had constructive notice of Petitioner
Allen's possibility of reverter pursuant to the recording statute. Record at 530. The court
of appeals likewise found that Respondent Hall knew of Petitioner Allen's possibility of
reverter. See Addendum, Exhibit "B." The court of appeals refers to Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970
P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998) for the proposition that a good faith belief in a life interest in
land satisfies the good faith requirement of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. That may
be so, but two additional observations from Jeffs need to be made. First, the claimants did
not have a actual legal title to a life estate. They merely believed that they had a life estate.
Again, the distinction is between color of title and legal title. Second, while the court
awarded the claimants recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, the facts of the
case are that the claimants' occupancy was terminated prior to the termination of the life
estate that they believed that they had. Jeffs should not be held for the proposition that the
claimants would have been entitled to recovery upon termination of their believed life estate
in the normal course, by operation of.
B.

Determination of the Value of Improvements.

The trial court ruled that Respondent Hall's claim under the Utah Occupying
Claimants Act was moot. The trial court made no award to Respondent Hall under this
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claim. Record at 545. The trial court found that Respondent Hall had spent $42,279.00 for
improvements to the Property, $ 10,000.00 for labor and $6,974.67 for real property taxes for
the years 1998 through 2002. Record at 530, paragraph 20. The trial court failed to find the
value of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements, or the value, as opposed to the cost,
of the improvements. The trial court merely identified the alleged cost of the improvements
as presented by Respondent Hall.

This finding is insufficient to comply with the

requirements of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. The trial court made no findings as to
what extent, if any, these expenditures increased the value of the Property.
The court of appeals found in the Record an increase in the value of the Property and
improperly assumed that the increase was a result of the improvements made by Respondent
Hall, ignoring all other market factors such as fluctuating interest rates, general economic
factors, or supply and demand. See Addendum, Exhibit "B."
In Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 156, 203 P.2d 387, 391-92 (1949), the court
explained that, "[t]he reasonable cost of the improvements, alone, is not sufficient evidence
of value,...." Id. 203 P.2d at 392. The Utah Supreme Court has further explained that to
allow a different measure of recovery, such as allowing the claimant to "recover costs of
construction, disassociated from land value and not limited to the extent of enhancement of
land value, which cost could well exceed such enhancement, would cast a burden upon the
record owner greater than the equitable requirement that he do equity by paying for unjust
enrichment." Id.
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In discussing the value of the improvements claimed under the Utah Occupying
Claimants Act, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the measure of recovery for the
improvements is the increased value of real property due to the improvements. The Supreme
Court stated, "the occupying claimant's measure of recovery is the extent to which his
improvements enhance the value of the land, or in other words, the difference between the
reasonable relative values of the land with and without the improvements." See Hi-Country
Estates v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah App. 1996).
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals in this case has met the standards
established by this Court for the determination of the value of improvements to real estate
under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act.
Respondent Hall had actual legal title to the Property in the form of a fee simple
determinable, subject to a possibility of reverter, and did not occupy the Property under color
of title as required by the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. Therefore, he has not met the
requirements of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act and should not be entitled to any
recovery under such Act. No determination of valuable improvements to the Property or the
value of such improvements has been made in compliance with the requirements of the Utah
Occupying Claimants Act. Therefore, if this Court determines that Respondent Hall is
entitled to recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, the issue of the value of the
improvements, if any, should be remanded to the trial court for a determination in accordance
with the Act. The findings of the court of appeals are not consistent with the requirements
of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act.
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II. WHETHER THE 1993 DEED REQUIRED ALLEN TO ASSUME ANY EXISTING
MORTGAGE NOTWITHSTANDING INTERVENING REFINANCING OF THAT
MORTGAGE BY ALLEN'S WIFE AND A THIRD-PARTY.
The 1993 Deed contains no provision for the payment of any debt encumbering the
Property by Petitioner Allen, except by reference to the Decree of Divorce. The Decree of
Divorce contains no provision for the payment of any debt encumbering the Property by
Petitioner Allen, except for the debt existing on the date of the Decree of Divorce. Neither
Respondent Hall nor Respondent Homecomings nor any of their successors in interest has
any claim against the Property or against Petitioner Allen for the payment of any debt that
may have encumbered the Property. To allow any such claim would be in conflict with
accepted principles of real property law and contract law.
Real Property Analysis
If principles of real property are applied in this case, neither Respondent Hall nor
Respondent Homecomings nor any of their successors in interest has any claim against the
Property.
Petitioner Allen conveyed title to the Property to Ms. Satterfield with the 1993 Deed.
That title consisted of a fee simple determinable, subject to a possibility of reverter, with
Petitioner Allen retaining the reversionary interest. At the time of the 1993 Deed the
Property was subject to a mortgage which secured the repayment of a note signed by both
Petitioner Allen and Ms. Satterfield.
Ms. Satterfield refinanced the Property. She alone signed the note, she alone received
the proceeds and satisfied the prior debt on the Property and she alone signed the mortgage
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of the Property to secure the repayment of the new debt. Because Ms. Satterfield was the
sole signer of the mortgage, then the security interest that was conveyed to the lender was
limited to her interest in the Property, a fee simple determinable, subject to possibility of
reverter. Petitioner Allen did not become a party to any financing or to any mortgage of the
Property after the date of the 1993 Deed.
When Ms. Satterfield quitclaimed the Property to Respondent Hall, she could only
convey to him and he could only receive so much interest in the Property as she legally
owned, a fee simple determinable, subject to a possibility of reverter. When Respondent Hall
refinanced the Property, his trust deed could only grant to Respondent Homecomings a
security interest in so much of the Property as he legally owned, a fee simple determinable,
subject to a possibility of reverter.
When Ms. Satterfield left the state of Utah in 1999, she triggered the determining
event of title to the Property and the possibility of reverter automatically terminated
Respondent Hall's interest in the Property, automatically terminated Respondent
Homecomings' security interest in the Property and then automatically vested title to the
Property in Petitioner Allen.
Upon the reversion of the Property to Mr. Allen, he held title to the Property free and
clear of any and all claims to the Property by Ms. Satterfield, Respondent Hall, Respondent
Homecomings and all those taking through them. Thus, while the Respondents argue that
the Decree of Divorce requires Petitioner Allen to satisfy their claims against the Property,
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the reality is that they have no claim against the Property nor have they established any basis
for any claim against Petitioner Allen.
Petitioner Allen is entitled lo ownership ul tin h o p c r h lice mid clem ol Jin and .ill

claiming through them.
Contract Analysis
If pi inciples of contract law are applied ii 1 tl lis case, neither KespcikK.

Petitioner Allen or against the Property.
The Decree ofDivorce is in the nature of a contract between two parties, Petitioner
Alloxan, ,\!
i
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exist and woiilerrini? rights that are not present. I h e court oi appeals concurred in this
erroneous construction.
1 1 le second sentence of Paragrapl i 10 of the Decree ofDivorce awaru:, .:.. : :opertv
t()I\ Is Satterfield. si lbjecttocei tail i coi lditioi is, ai id states ,c[t]l le defei idai it
shall be responsible for all indebtedness and expenses therefrom, holding the plaintiff
[Petitioner Allen] harmless therefrom." This portion of the Decree ofDivorce is absolutely
clear tl lat l"\ Is Satterfield alone is respoi isible foi all indebted] K.-

indebtedness and expenses oi the Propel

^

encumbei the

.A addition, Petitioner Allen is to be held
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harmless from all indebtedness and expenses of the Property. This language does not impose
any obligation on Petitioner Allen for any indebtedness or expenses of the Property. To the
contrary, Petitioner Allen is to be held harmless from all indebtedness and expenses of the
Property.
The fifth sentence of Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce states in part that upon
the occurrence of the triggering event, "the ownership of the marital residence [the Property]
shall revert to the plaintiff [Petitioner Allen], who will then sell the home and divide the
proceeds equally with the defendant [Ms. Satterfield], and who will be responsible for all
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold." It is clear from the foregoing that the order of
events is (i) reversion of the Property to Petitioner Allen, (ii) sale of the Property, (iii)
division of the proceeds, and (iv) Petitioner Allen to service the debt on the Property from
the point in time that ownership reverts to him until the Property is sold. There is nothing
in the Decree of Divorce that places any obligation on Petitioner Allen to satisfy or pay-off
any indebtedness of the Property, but only the responsibility to service the indebtedness until
the Property is sold, at which time he would be reimbursed for any outlays pursuant to the
above referenced "hold harmless" provision.
Additional clarification comes from a reading of the final sentence of Paragraph 10
of the Decree of Divorce which states that "[t]hese provisions are to ensure that the children
have a suitable residence during their minority, are structured to provide a benefit to the
defendant [Ms. Satterfield] if she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the form
of all of the equity in said home, and a detriment if she shall move, in the form of the loss of
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determined by UK existing indebtedness. \L Sattcrtkld and Petitioner Allen each have a
claim to one-half the Property, subject to one-half the existing indebtedness. Ms. Satterfield

Divorce.
The trial court and the court of appeals both construed the Decree of Divorce to permit
IV Is. Satterfield to encumber and borrow agaii ist Petitioner Allen' s one-half of the I Property,,

intent of the parties and would render the Decree of Divorce a nullity. The analysis needs
to be focused on the intent of the parties to the Decree of Divorce and not on the interest of
the unrelated Respondents.
When "
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Allen testified that the loan balance at that time was approximate^ $75,560.1,
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Property was sold to Respondent Hall, Petitioner Allen testified that the loan balance wot ild

1:1 le loan balance woi ild 1 ia\ e bee i I appi oxii nately $58,759,60,
Ms. Satterfield had the ability under the Decree of Divorce to deal only with her
interest in the Property That interest consisted of a fee simple determinable, subject to a
possibility ' of re\ ei ter; a i igl it to oi le 1 lalf of tl le equity ii l the I 'ropei ty, as determined based
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equity in the Property if she remained in Salt Lake City, Utah, until the last child of the
marriage reached age 18. The Decree of Divorce did not give Ms. Satterfield any rights to
deal with Petitioner Allen's one-half of the Property.
Ms. Satterfield did not stay in Salt Lake City, and upon the occurrence of the
determining event, Ms. Satterfield, and her successors in interest, had their interest in the
Property terminated and ownership of the Property vested in Petitioner Allen.
Respondents suggested at trial that the equity to which Petitioner Allen was entitled
upon the occurrence of the determining event was limited to the equity on the date of the
Decree of Divorce. This is not what the Decree of Divorce says. If that were the intent, then
the language of the Decree of Divorce would have specified a dollar amount of the proceeds,
representing the agreed equity, to go to Petitioner Allen with the balance to go to Ms.
Satterfield. Instead, the Decree of Divorce directs that Petitioner Allen is to divide the
proceeds from the sale, whenever that might occur, equally with Ms. Satterfield. The
reasonable reading here is that the proceeds would be divided equally after satisfaction of the
indebtedness existing on the date of the Decree of Divorce, indebtedness on which Petitioner
Allen and Ms. Satterfield were jointly and severally liable, resulting in an equal equity
division.
As was shown at trial, Ms. Satterfield, through the means of refinancing accelerated
the realization of the equity to which she would have been entitled. However, the Decree of
Divorce does not give Ms. Satterfield any right to accelerate the realization of any portion
of Petitioner Allen's equity to which she might have become entitled had she satisfied the
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provisions of the Decree of Divorce. Nor does the Decree of Divorce give any other person
a right to realize any portion of Petitioner Allen's interest in the Property.
Ambiguity
I In In lull i ill!! I Hind llliiil Ihr I Vi i n nl 1 Msout' v ;r. iiiiilnii»uoii% „iiinl iiiiilii'ipnlnll illlhir
Decnv ,
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MI) that o die Pmpertv reverted to Petitioner Allen, the Propv*i\

would be subject to all liens and encumbrances at the time of reversion. Record at 5 50.
paragraph 2. The court of appeals agreed. See Addendum, Exhibit " B . " I hi> uwdv . erroneous.
Whenambigi lity exists. It le ii ltei it of tt le partie s be coi lies aqi lestion of fact. Plateau
Mining Co. V. Utah Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, 802 l\2d 720, 725 (Utah

. Ji

Therefore, "failure to resolve an ambiguity by determining the parties' intent from,, parol
evidence is erro

. t i IOI lstrateai i ibigi lity "tl lecoi ltrai } positioi is <

pai ties ii n ist

each be tenable " I :1
First, there are only two parties to the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner Allen and. Ms.
Satterfield.

Second, there is no evidence of contrary positions, tenable or otherwise.

Coi lsequei lib ' , tl lei e is i 10 ai i ibigi iit> ii I tl le Disci ee of Dn > :)i ce
I 'etitioner \,l.lei I testified as to the intent of the parties to the Decree of Divorce.
Record at 586 and 589. If the Property reverted to hit n, he would be responsible to make the
payments on the debt until the Property was sold, but the only debt to which the Property was
be si lbject was to be tl i,e debt e: dsting at tl ic tii i le of theDeci ee of Di »/ oi ce.
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Respondents Hall and Homecomings are not parties to the Decree of Divorce and their
claims as to the meaning of the Decree of Divorce are irrelevant.
Respondents' Standing to Assert Claims
Respondent Hall and Respondent Homecomings have both attempted to protect their
interests by alleging a claim against Petitioner Allen and the Property under the Decree of
Divorce.

It has already been shown that neither Respondent Hall nor Respondent

Homecomings has any remaining interest in the Property because their interests terminated
with the fee simple determinable. Likewise, neither Respondent Hall nor Respondent
Homecomings has any rights against Petitioner Allen or the Property under the Decree of
Divorce. The Decree of Divorce is in the nature of a contract and the Respondents are
neither parties to the contract nor third-party beneficiaries of the contract.
A fundamental principle of contract law is privity: that only parties to the contract may
enforce the rights and obligations created by the contract. 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts §421
(1991). Respondents are not parties to the Decree of Divorce and therefore may not enforce
any rights or obligations created by the Decree of Divorce.
The existence of third-party beneficiary status "is determined by examining a written
contract." Am. Towers Owners Assoc., Inc. v. CC1 Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah
1996). The written contract must show that the contracting parties "clearly intended to confer
a separate and distinct benefit upon the third-party." Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854
P.2d 527,536 (Utah 1993). There was no apparent intent in the Decree of Divorce to confer
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i LI i) be i lefit oni eitl ler of the Respondents. Thus, they are not entitled to any recovery under
the Decree of Divorce.
If Respondent 1lomeeomings were entitled to any recovery under iia decree of
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award Respondent Homecomings any claim under the Decree of Divorce is in conflict with
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. tfterthe i - ; .'ced nor the Decree of Divorce requires Petitioner Allen lo assume
)i i i„, i • it! l respect to the Proper t) except tl le ai nor tizedbalai IC z it:
what would have been the amortized balance, of the debt which existed on the Propert) on
the date of the Decree of Divorce.
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Petitionei Allen claimed, and the court of appeals ultimately decided, that he held a
reversionary interest in the Property. IJpon the occurrence of the triggering event, ownership
of the Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen.
1 11 I ;:!: ti iiiiall :> : in ii t ::l ;::i: lii z :1 I etitioi lei
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Respondents. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law, one way or the
other, respecting this claim of Petitioner Allen. I lowevei; consistent with the trial court's
ruiMK- ihdi l\jiiih'in.i Aiien had no interest in the Property, the trial court likely considered
I 'etitioi lei < Ulei 1" s claii 1 1 fc 1 1 estiti itic -\ 1 of 1 in iji 11st ei iricl 11 1 lei it a 1 11 lllitj '
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All rights to the Property automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen on or about July
15, 1999. Respondent Hall testified that subsequent to July 15, 1999 and until the date of
trial he personally occupied the Property for part of the time and rented the Property for part
of the time. Respondent Hall testified that the fair market rental of the Property was between
$1,200.00 per month and $1,400.00 per month. Record at 642-643.
In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, three elements must be met. First,
there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the conferee must
appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be the acceptance or
retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable
for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B
& L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, f 1 3 , 12 P.3d 580.
The court of appeals has reversed the trial court and ruled that the Property
automatically reverted to Petitioner Allen. Consequently, the denial of Petitioner Allen's
claim for restitution of unjust enrichment must also be reversed and considered.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner Allen asks the Supreme Court (i) to reverse the
court of appeals' ruling that Respondent Hall is entitled to recovery under the Utah
Occupying Claimants Act or, if it is not inclined to do so, to reverse the court of appeals'
ruling that the Utah Occupying Claimants Act was properly applied to determine the amount
of the recovery to which Respondent Hall is entitled; (ii) to reverse the court of appeals'
ruling that Petitioner Allen is responsible for all indebtedness on the Property existing at the
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time of the reversion and to find that Petitioner Allen is entitled to the Property free and clear
of all indebtedness excepting and amount equal to the amortized balance of the indebtedness
on tin Property al the dale ul llir Decree nil Divorce.
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reconsideration consistent with the ruling of the court of appeals that ownership of the
Property reverted to Petitioner Allen nisL^ * 5 1 f ) 0 °
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EXHIBIT

EXHIBIT *VT
UTAH OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS ACT
y1 l> I ""1 iv ill e\ee 11 I il (I i ni ni nil |iiiiiiill| iiiiii ill illl pii'ist .ion
Where an occupant of teal esiale lias coloi oi title lo the teal estate, and ill i > I
(ailli has made valuable improvement*1 on (he real estate, and is afterwards in a p i o p u
action tound not to be the owner, no
million shall issue to put the owner in possession
of the real estate after the filing of a i mi j I mnt as hereinafter provided, until the
provisions of this chapter have been complied w ill h
57-6-2. Claimant to commence action — Complaint Trial of issues.
Such complaint must set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks relief,
stating as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive of the
improvements thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such
improvements. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, and the value < >t
the real estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial.
57-6-3. Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or holding as tenants in
conini mi iiii
I he plaint i fl in the main action ma) thereupon pay the appraised \ alue of the
impnnements and take the property, but should he fail to do so after a reasonable time, to
be fixed by the court, the defendant may take the property upon paying its value
exclusive of the improvements. If this is not done within a reasonable time, to be fixed by
the court, the parties will be held to be tenants in common of all the real estate, including
the impro^ ements, each holding an interest proportionate to the values ascertained on the
trial
S7 0-4. Certain persons considued lo hold under color of title.
[1) A purchaser in good faith at an) judicial or tax sale made b> the proper person
or officer has color of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person
or officer has sufficient authority to self unless the want of authority was known to tin
purchaser at the time of the sale.
(2) (a) Any person has color oi title nlio lias occupied a tiatl ol ical estate try
himsell, or by those under whom he claims, for the term of five years, or who has
occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, have at any time during
the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, express or implied, of the real owner made
an) valuable improvements on the real estate, or if he or those under whom he claims
have at any time during the occupancy paid the ordinary count) taxes on the real estate for
any one year, and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the owner, and the
occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action is brought by which the
recovery of the real estate is obtained.
(b) The person's rights shall pas* I i In assignees or represonhln rs.

\

1

(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title against
their landlords or give any person a claim under color of title to school or institutional
trust lands as defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6).
57-6-5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract deemed occupying
claimants.
When any person has settled upon any real estate and occupied the same for three
years under or by virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers of the state for the
purchase thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from, the United
States, and shall have made valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be
the owner thereof, or not to have acquired a right to purchase the same from the state or
the United States, such person shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of this
chapter.
57-6-6. Setoff against claim for improvements.
In the cases above provided for, if the occupying claimant has committed any
injury to the real estate by cutting timber, or otherwise, the plaintiff may set the same off
against any claim for improvements made by the claimant.
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession may issue.
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an execution to put him in possession
of his property in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, but not otherwise.
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants of land granted to state.
Any person having improvements on any real estate granted to the state in aid of
any work of internal improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by another, may
remove such improvements without injury otherwise to such real estate, at any time
before he is evicted therefrom, or he may claim and have the benefit of this chapter by
proceeding as herein directed.
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THORNE, Judge:
i, i
iJdvid J .'Allen appeals from the trial coui t's order quieting
title in real property in favor of Thomas K. Hall and Homecomings
Financial Network, Inc. We reverse in part and affirm in part
BACKGROUND
11J
Allen and his former spouse, Sarah Satterfield Allen
(Satterfield), were divorced in 1990. The divorce decree awarded
Satterfield real property owned by Allen, contingent upon her
maintaining the house payments and not moving more than fifty
miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, until after the parties 1
youngest child turned eighteen 1 I Jpon the failure of either of

Paragraph 10 of All en and Satterfield's divorce decree
statedi
[Allen] is purchasing the house and lot
located at 10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah
(continued

these two conditions the property and all of its related debt
were to revert to Allen, and the property was to be sold. Any
equity realized from the sale was to be divided equally between
Allen and Satterfield. Allen and Satterfield's youngest child
did not turn eighteen until August 6, 2003.
f3
Allen transferred the property to Satterfield by quitclaim
deed in 1993. The deed contained the following language of
reservation:
This Quit-Claim Deed is subject to the rights
and reservations included in that certain
Decree of Divorce entered by the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah in the case of David John Allen
v. Sarah Satterfield Allen, Civil No.
894903635 (dated May 17, 1990). Said Decree
1.

(...continued)
which shall be awarded to [Satterfield] as
her sole and separate property subject to no
claim by [Allen] except as set forth in this
paragraph.
[Satterfield] shall be
responsible for all indebtedness and expenses
therefrom, holding [Allen] harmless
therefrom.
[Allen] shall provide
[Satterfield] with a quit-claim deed within
3 0 days of the divorce becoming final, with
said quit-claim deed to contain the
provisions that it is contingent upon
[Satterfield] maintaining durrent [sic] house
payments and not moving from the Salt Lake
City area before the [parties'] last child
reaches age 18. . . . If [Satterfield] shall
move more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City
Utah before the last child reaches age 18,
ownership of the marital residence shall
revert to [Allen] , who will then sell the
home and divide the proceeds equally with
[Satterfield], and who1 will be responsible
for all indebtedness thereon until the house
is sold. These provisions are to ensure that
the children have a suitable residence during
their minority, and are structured to provide
a benefit to [Satterfield] if she shall
continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah in
the form of all of the equity in said home,
and a detriment if she shall move, in the
form of the loss of one-half of the equity.

of Divorce provides, in part, that if the
grantee fails to maintain current house
payments or if the grantee shall move more
than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah,
before the grantor and grantee's last child
reaches 18 year [sic] of age, title and
ownership of the above described property
shall revert to the grantor.
The deed from Allen to Satterfield was recorded in Salt Lake
County in 1994.
14
Satterfield refinanced the property several times between
1990 and 1998. Allen was aware of some of these actions, and
assisted Satterfield in refinancing the property on at least one
occasion by providing her with an affidavit. Allen never
objected to Satterfield's actions, despite their practical effect
of reducing the property's equity value, to which Allen had a
contingent interest.
%5
In January 1998, Satterfield sold the property to Hall.
Hall paid Satterfield $7000 in cash and agreed to assume the
existing first and second mortgages totaling approximately
$139,000. Satterfield transferred the property to Hall by
quitclaim deed and continued to reside in the Salt Lake City
area. In June 1999, Hall retired the existing mortgages by
refinancing the property with appellee Homecomings Financial
Network, Inc., in the amount of $151,900. Homecomings then
recorded a security interest in the property.
f6
Satterfield moved to North Carolina in July 1999. Shortly
thereafter, Allen contacted Hall and made a claim to the property
under the terms of the deed and the incorporated divorce decree.
Hall refused to recognize Allen's claim, and in 2000 Allen
brought suit against Hall to quiet title under the deed. Hall
counterclaimed for reimbursement for valuable improvements and
other damages.
1)7 After a bench trial, the trial court quieted title to the
property in Hall. The court entered extensive findings of fact
and conclusions of law to support its order. Among its reasons
for quieting title in Hall, the court listed laches, estoppel,
and unjust enrichment; extinguishment of Allen's interest based
upon lack of equity as established during Satterfield's 1998
bankruptcy proceeding; and ambiguity in the divorce decree
resulting in substantial inequitable harm to Hall. The trial
court also found that, if Allen were to be awarded title to the

property, he would take the property subject to all existing debt
thereon, and that Hall would be entitled to reimbursement for
$42,279.36 in improvements, $10,000 in labor, and $6974.67 in
real property taxes.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f8
Allen raises multiple issues challenging the trial court's
application of the law of real property and the Utah Occupying
Claimants Act (Claimants Act), see Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 to -8
(2000). Allen's arguments present questions of law that we
review for correctness. See Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs.,
Inc. , 1999 UT 100,1(31, 989 P.2d 1077 (reviewing trial court's
legal conclusions regarding application of estoppel doctrine for
correctness); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998)
(reviewing interpretation of Claimants Act for correctness) ;
Nelson v. Provo City, 2000 UT App 204,1(9, 6 P. 3d 567 (reviewing
questions of property law for correctness); Anderson v. Poms,
1999 UT App 207,1[8, 984 P.2d 392 (" [T] he determination of whether
a party was prejudiced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is
a legal conclusion that we review for correctness [.]") ; Eyring v.
Fairbanks, 918 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (reviewing
divorce decree for ambiguity under correctness standard);
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) ("Review of the trial court's conclusion as to the
legal effect of the bankruptcy court's orders presents a question
of law.")

ANALYSIS
f9
The trial court's quiet title order rested on various
theories, including laches, estoppel, and unjust enrichment.
Allen argues that each theory relied upon by the trial court
ignores the clear conditional language of Allen's recorded 1993
property deed to Satterfield, and the statutory presumption that
Hall had full knowledge of that recorded instrument when he
purchased the property from Satterfield in 1998. See Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-102(1) (2000) ("Each [deed] shall, from the time of
recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to
all persons of [its] contents.").
KlO We agree with Allen that the terms of the deed entitled him
to a possibility of reverter that became a fee simple interest
upon Satterfield's moving to North Carolina in July 1999. We
also agree that, pursuant to section 57-3-102, Hall is deemed to
have had notice of Allen's interest from the time of recording in
1994. See id.; see also Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready
Mix, Inc. , 2004 UT 23,1(17, 89 P.3d 155 ("' [O] ne who deals with

real property is charged with notice of what is shown by the
records of the county recorder of the county in which the
property is situated.1" (quoting Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55,
1 P.2d 242, 247 (1931))). However sympathetic to Hall the facts
of this case might be if he did not have notice of Allen's
interest, we must proceed under the statutory presumption that
Hall was aware that he was purchasing property subject to
potential divestiture if Satterfield relocated.
i|ll Hall's notice of Allen's interest destroys any equitable
ground upon which the court could quiet title in Hall, as Hall
cannot be said to have had any good faith belief that he was
purchasing the property in fee simple. The trial court's
reliance on Satterfield's bankruptcy proceedings is also
misplaced given the language of the deed and divorce decree,
which we find to be clear and unambiguous. Even if, as found by
the trial court, there was no equity in the property at the time
that it was released from the bankruptcy proceeding, Allen was
still entitled to title ownership of the property once the
conditions in the deed to Satterfield were satisfied. In sum, as
Allen asserts on appeal, Hall knowingly purchased only that
property interest that Satterfield had to sell. That property
interest reverted to Allen in 1999 when Satterfield left the
state, and title must be quieted in Allen rather than Hall. 2
fl2 Having determined that Allen is entitled to the property, we
must address the question of whether Allen must also assume the
current debt on the property. The trial court concluded,
pursuant to the divorce decree, that Allen would be responsible
for all indebtedness on the property if he were to retake it. We
agree. The decree, which was incorporated into the 1993 deed,
states that upon reversion Allen "will be responsible for all
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold." This clear
language indicates that Allen takes the property subject to any
debt existing at the time of the reversion, and we affirm the
trial court on this issue.
Ul3 Further, we can identify no error in the trial court's
application of the Claimants Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 to
-8 (2000) . The Claimants Act states, in part:
Where an occupant of real estate has color of
title to the real estate, and in good faith
has made valuable improvements on the real
estate, and is afterwards in a proper action
found not to be the owner, no execution shall
2. Subject to the requirements of the Claimants Act.
Code Ann. § 57-6-1 to -8 (2000) .

See Utah

issue to put the owner in possession of the
real estate after the filing of a complaint
as hereinafter provided, until the provisions
of this chapter have been complied with.
Id. § 57-6-1. Thus, one seeking reimbursement under the
Claimants Act must show that he or she had color of title to real
property, made valuable improvements to that property, and did so
in good faith. Allen concedes on appeal that Hall had color of
title to the property when he made improvements to it.
1|l4 Allen did not preserve any objection to the trial court's
use of Hall's evidence regarding the value of goods and labor
expended in improving the property, nor did Allen present any
contradictory evidence suggesting that the improvements were for
a lesser amount. Even if this issue had been preserved, there is
record evidence supporting the trial court's determination that
Hall is entitled to reimbursement for improvements and labor in
the amount of $52,279.36.
1|l5 The trial court found that, at the time Hall purchased the
property, it had a "fair market value [of] approximately
$146,000." This finding is supported by Satterfield and Hall's
agreed upon price of $146,000 for the property in January 1998,
and by Satterfield's March 1998 bankruptcy filing and subsequent
ruling by the bankruptcy court. By April 1999, after Hall's
improvements, the property was appraised at $200,000. Hall
testified as to the appraisal value at trial, and submitted the
appraisal report as an exhibit. The $54,000 difference between
fair market value at purchase and the April 1999 appraisal value
of $200,000 approximates and readily supports the trial court's
determination of the proper reimbursement amount.
1|l6 Finally, contrary to Allen's assertions on appeal, Hall
acted in good faith in improving the property. Even assuming, as
we must, that Hall knew of the possibility of reversion of the
property to Allen, Hall had a good faith belief in his ownership
of the property until he received notice that Satterfield had
actually fulfilled the condition in the deed, sometime after June
1999. Cf. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998)
(concluding that a good faith belief in a life interest in land
satisfies the good faith requirement of the Claimants A c t ) . From
the record, it is apparent that the improvements claimed by Hall
all occurred in 1998, prior to Satterfield's departure from Utah.
1Il7 The trial court properly applied the Claimants Act to
determine the amount of Hall's reimbursement. On remand, the
trial court is to apply the remaining provisions of the Claimants

Act to ensure that Hall is reimbursed for his claim prior to
Allen taking title to the property.3
CONCLUSION
fl8 Allen is ent itled to the property pursuant to the terms of
the divorce decre e and his deed to Satterfield. Allen will take
the property subj ect to all debts thereon, and only upon
reimbursement to Hall pursuant to the Claimants Act. We reverse
the trial court's quiet title order, affirm the trial court's
determinations re garding Allen's responsibility for debt on the
property and Hall 's Claimants Act claim, and remand the matter
for further proce edings consistent with this opinion.

Willia-
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WE CONCUR:

^UC^AJ}
iith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Norman H. Jackson, J g ^ e

3. The Claimants Act sets out the procedures to be followed
after a successful claim for reimbursement for improvements:
The plaintiff in the main action may
thereupon pay the appraised value of the
improvements and take the property, but
should he fail to do so after a reasonable
time, to be fixed by the court, the defendant
may take the property upon paying its value,
exclusive of the improvements. If this is
not done within a reasonable time, to be
fixed by the court, the parties will be held
to be tenants in common of all the real
estate, including the improvements, each
holding an interest proportionate to the
values ascertained on the trial.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3.
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SKRAX SATTERFIELD ALLEN,
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,
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\
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^
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" *

This matter czune on for hearing the 17th day of May, 1990.
The plaintiff was present with his attorney, Jane Allen. The
defendant was not present, having executed and filed with the court
an appearancer conscmt, and waiver in which she agreed that her-v.
default *nay be entered* Based upon the testimony of the plaintiff,
the? file herein, good cause appearing therefor, and the court
having made and entered the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, it is hereby ordared, adjudged, and decrsad:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
la The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce, the same to
become final upon entry.
2.

The plaintiff has been '\ resident of Salt LaJce County for

the three months immediately prior to the filing of this Complaint
for Divorce
3.

The parties were married on

Hay 31, IDOB in chatanpoga,

W

CP PPC LEGRi
w
Y 31 2000 15:37 FR RFC LXGH-

G12 979 4190 TO 918013281445

P. 12/17

/**

V e n n ^ e e , and are now and have beon sinc^ that time husband and
wife,
4e

The parties suffer from irreconcilabla differences,

5-

Thero have been £49MBr« Qttildratn

wit:

born of this marriage, to

Ashley Angier, b o m January 24, 1981; Samuel Havid Allen,

born August 13, 1982; Peter Kale Allan, born October 12, 1902; and
William John, born August 25, 1985.
6.

The defendant i5 a fit and proper person to be awarded

the care, custody and control of the minor children of the partios
subject

to

the plaintiff's

reasonable

and

liberal

rights

of

visitation, upon reasonable notice to the defendant.
7the

The plaintiff sha.ll pay child support to tho defendant in

amount

children

of

$200.00 per child,

5800.00

total

for the

four

until said child reaches age 18 or graduates from high

school with his or her class, whichever comes last.
8.

The

defendant shall

be

entitled

to Mandatory

income

withholding relief should the plaintiff" become more than 3 0 days
in arrears in his child support obligation.
9.

The plaintiff shall koep in force any policy of health

and accident insurance available through his

employment or pay ths

cost to provide insuranca through tho defendant's employment, for
the

benefit

plaintiff

of

to pay

the

minor

children

of

the

parties, with

thfc

any non-routine modical, demtal, optical, or

orthodontic expenses incurred by the minor children of the parties
which is not covered by insurance* The plaintiff shall bear the
cost of caid insurance, which presently is 560.00 per month.
10.

The* plaintiff ia purchasing the house and lot located at

~n CP KC lXGfiL
>AY 31 20o0 15:37 FR RFC LLbR-

612 979 4190 TO 9180i328i4«

P. H'17

lOlbL? i. landers Road, Sandy, Utah which shall fro award&d to the
defendant as her sole and separata property subject to no claim by
the plaintiff except as set forth in this paragraph.

Thu defendant

shall bo rcponsiblc for all indebtedness and expenses therefrom,
holdinq

the plaintiff

harmless

therefrom-

The

plaintiff- ^hal"'

provide the defendant with o quit-claim deed within 3 0 day^ of tha
divorce becoming final, with said quit-claim deed to contain the
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant maintaining
durrent house payments and not moving from the Salt Lake City arek
before

the last child reaches age 10.

If the defendant shall

become more than 60 days in arrears in the payments for aaid house,
the plaintiff shall have the option of paying the mortgage payment
directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and sending the
difference, if any, to the defendant.

If the defendant shall move

more than 50 miles from Salt Lake city Utah before the last child
reaches age 18, ownership of the marital residence shall revert to
iftttflBLaitvtiff,who will then se31 the home and ^ P U f e the proceeds
equally with the defendant, and who will be responsible for all
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold.

These provisions are

to ensure that the children have a suitable residenca during their
minority, and arc structured to provide a benefit to tha defendant
if she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah in the form
of all of the equity in said heme, and a detriment if she shal]
move, in
11.

the form of the loss of one-half of the equity.
The personal proporty of the parties has been divided

equitably botwoon them ^n<3 each party shall retain the property
presently m

his or her poserssio' , with the party retaining an item

to ba responsible far all indebtedness thereon*
12.

The plaintiff shall pay alimony to thfc defendant at the

rats of §800,00 per month beginning May 1, 1990 and continuing
until April 31 ; 1991, at which tixu'i it shall decrease to 5400, oo
per month.
in the

If the defendant shall earn more than $12,000 per year

first year

following

thp

divorce, the

alimony

shall

immediately decrease to $400.00 par month* Said alimony shall
terminate upon the death of either party or by operation o f law.
Child support and alimony payments aru dua in two equal payments
on the 1st and 15th of each month.
13.

The plaintiff shall retain the automobile presently in

his possession and the defendant 3hs.ll retain the Volkswagen with
the

plaintiff

to

be

responsible

for

all

indebtedness

^nd

maintenance expenses, holding the defendant harmless therefrom,
for his automobile/ and also the vol-csvagcn and he shall jaako ail
car payments and maintain insurance coverage until such time as tho
Automobile is sold by the defendant ur paid for in full, at which
time the plaintiff shall deliver title to said automobile to the
defendant and this obligation shall cease,

This obligation shall

terminate on the death of the defendant/ ox when paid in full
whichever comes first, and shall ba considered alimony for tax
purposes•
14.

Tha plaintiff shall pay the debt for the Volkswagen. Thr-.

defendant shall pay all student loans ^n her name alone. Each party
shall be solely responsible for all debts incurred in his or her
own name* after Dacsrober, X980, holding the other party harmless
therefrom.

The plaintiff knows of no unpaid marital debts.

r.YJl 20CB i5:3T, f R ^

15.

UL.UK.

Tho plaintiff shall maintain a life insurance policy on

his life in uhe amount of $250,000, tha proceeds of which sha3 1 be
payable into a trust of which all cC the parties* children ^ra tho
beneficiaries, which shall b& maintained until the youngc:,t. child
reaches age 22 or graduates from collage with his clas:>t, vmichovcj
occuirs later.
16*

The

defendant shall claim all of the

children

as

dependents for income tax purposes.
17.

The plaintiff shall provide for the children:*f college

educations if he is -Tinanoially ablg in an amount not inora than hie
child support obligation, on the condition that they maintain at
least a ,fB,f average c.nd attend school full time. $aia support shall
end at age 22 or upon graduation from college with an undargraduatc
degree, whichever Comes first*
18.

The plaintiff has paid all attorneys's foes and costs

incurred in this action to data.

DATED this IZ

day of J2t^f^

/ 1990,

By THE COURT:

.ka\i$ge John A- Ro)?icn
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
*rti£y that I mailed a 'crua and correct copy oi the
foregoing decree of divorce to Sarah Satterfield Allen, 10150
Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 84070, postage prepaid this £7. day off
May, 1990,
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EXHIBIT "D"

Mtfcjprft* w> ii I urn

0S/iJ/9< 0?;5n Att
KATIE l _

prraN
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RBCPRDEQ a^mr* TQI
E- H. PAiNKItAJSER
A r t o r n o y a t Law
2 4 i Cast 400 South, Suite ZOO
5 * I t Luke C i t y , Utnh 84111

D a v i a J* Allen f c a n t o r

lO-QO
DXXOH

RECQKOER; SALT LAKi: CQUHTYr UTAH
E H FAHKHAUSER
REC QTJZ JOHrWSDtf
I O L H J T V - HP

fc'Tnby

flUIT-CUaiS,

s u b j e c t 1.0 tin

r*4»t^vationa, rovsriuons, wid a^captignG contained harain, to Garah
S a t . t w r f i c l d A l l e n , grantee, of 1C159 South Flandara Road, 2andy
c i t y , S a l t Lake County, S t a t e o l Utah f o r tha sun or t-:n ana
fia/iooths
Dollars
($10.QO)
an J other
good
and
vciuablc
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , tho following d e s c r i b e d t r a c t u£ land i n G<il'. UU',;L
c g u n t y , s t a t ^ of UtJiiu
Lot; 3 , . WHITE CITY NO. 41, according t o t h a o z r i c i a l p l a t
t h e r e o f , as recorded i n t n s o££iou o f tha s a l t : Lake.
County Recorder•
T h i s Quit-Claim D6ud i s cuhjaoti to t h e r i g h t s and r e s e r v a t i o n s
i n c l u d e d i n t h a t c e r t a i n Decree of Divorca ontcrod by thu Third
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t court, s a l t Lak^ County, 3'cata of Utah i n tha
c a c e o f Dgvifl John ^llen v, Saro>. S a t t o r f l a l d A l l a n . c i v D No.
G94903635 (datad May 17, 1990),
s a i d Decree of o i v o r c o prowidcy,
i n p a r t , t h a t i f tho grantee f a i l s t o nuxintain c u r r e n t hciujc:
payments or- it tha grant*© s h a l l rccva more than 50 m i l a e frcr. a a l t
Laka C i t y , Utah/ tuforu the grantor and g v a n t e s ' a larri: c h i l d
r e a c h e s 16 year of ago, *%!tlfijf*and ownership oC thfe &hm9bjQttG&ilN&
fMiffettfey s h a l l rovart t o t h e grantor*
WITNESS tha hand Q£ s a i d graotar,

tyls

2Bth day o£ Gcuobsr

1933,

IHWVXDUAt, ACteiOHteDGEWENff
STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OF^fffJ'

{(? Qm

J

A3.

On t h i s zo^h day of o c t o b e - 199 3 r boforo me p e r s o n a l l y
appanrad David J. A l l e n , who being by m* duly sworn did cay t h a t ho
i s t h e s i g n e r of tna foregoing instrurcfcrxt
and who
who duly
duly acknowledged
acknowledged
urtfcrxt and
t o Mi* t h a t hfc/shc cxccqtaa the oara6//7
My

i a o i o n Expirac:

OlUWmALLAN^qUITCLJSCa

Raiding atiJLP/,. f &/('•'/&£££,'-

,
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foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Thomas K. Hall
448 East Golden Pheasant
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NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN
68 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.
Sarah Satterfield Allen
130 Glenburnie Lane #1-104
Durham, North Carolina 27704-3072
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